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RECENT DECISIONS
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: BACK INJURY INCURRED IN THE NORMAL
COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT IS NOT AN INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT.-In 1964,
claimant suffered a "lumbrosacral strain" while working at employment
covered by the Montana Workmen's Compensation Act. Claimant, a
lumber stacker, incurred the back injury when he bent over to pick up a
block of wood. His claim for benefits was denied by the Industrial Acci-
dent Board, but the district court reversed that holding. On appeal by
the Board to the Montana Supreme Court, held, reversed. The claimant
failed to establish an "industrial accident" under the "industrial injury"
statute' which requires a tangible happening of a traumatic nature from
an unexpected cause. James v. V. K. V. Lumber Co., 145 Mont. 466, 401
P.2d 282 (1965).
Whether an injury resulting from strain is compensable under work-
men's compensation law has been the source of much litigation. This
problem has not been confined to courts of this country, but has arisen
in England where compensation acts originated. 2 Since strain 3 is internal
and the symptoms largely subjective, it is often difficult to determine
whether there is any connection between the strain and the employment.
The solution to this problem is based on the interpretation each state
gives to the word "accident". 4
Historically "accident" has been given liberal construction. Because
English compensation acts provided the stimulus for such legislation in
the U. S., the English interpretation of "accident" is significant. Lord
McNaughton defined the term as "an unlooked for mishap or an un-
toward event which is not expected or designed." 5 Another English
jurist has stated that an "accident" is to be construed "in the popular
sense as plain people would understand it."'6 After pointing to a variety
of meanings he declared: "In short, the common meaning of this word
is ruled neither by logic nor by etymology, but by custom, and no for-
mula will precisely express its usage in all cases." The English courts
have consistently held that an employee sustains an injury "by accident"
if either the cause or the result is unexpected, unforeseen, or uninten-
tional.7
A very substantial majority of courts of this country have adopted
'REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 92-418. (Hereafter REVISED CODES OF MONTANA
will be cited R.C.M..)
21 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 37.20, at 512 (1961).
aStrain-''An overstretching or overexertion of some part of the musculature," to
an extreme or harmful degree. DORLAND, ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (23d
ed. 1957).
'The terms "accidental injury" or "injury by accident" appear in most compensa-
tion acts. 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 512-13.
5Fenton v. Thorley & Co., Ltd., [1903] A. C. 443.
'Trim Joint School v. Kelly [1914] A. C. 667, 680-81 (Loreburn, L., concurring).
'Fenton v. Thorley Co. Ltd., supra note 5; Clover, Clayton, & Co., Ltd., v. Hughes
[1910] A. C. 242.
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the English rule." This majority holds that an injury is accidental where
either the cause or result is unexpected or accidental, although the work
being done is usual and ordinary.9 It is generally recognized that the un-
expected, unusual, or undesigned event or occurrence which is essential
to constitute an accident may be either exertion or the consequence of
exertion.' 0
Many states allow compensation for a disabling back injury, such as
a strain, although the injury or strain does not result from unusual force
or exertion." The rationale of this majority position exemplifies the
theory underlying workmen's compensation. 12 Since the benefit is di-
rectly for employees and only indirectly for society, workmen's compen-
sation acts should be construed liberally in favor of the employee.
13
A minority of jurisdictions allow compensation only when the re-
sulting injury is a consequence of unusual, excessive strain or exertion. 14
However, this minority allows compensation if the ordinary exertion of
the workman is accompanied by a muscular strain or twist which causes
a change in the structure or tissues of the body. 15
The Montana Supreme Court in the instant case was faced with the
problem of construing the statutory definition of injury. This involved
consideration of the "industrial injury"'16 concept under the old and new
statutes.17 The concept of "industrial injury" as used in the Montana
Workmen's Compensation Act has been subjected to much judicial inter-
pretation by the Montana Supreme Court. Prior to 1961, Montana fol-
8SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION TEXT § 1446 (Supp. 1959).
199 C. J. S. Workmen's Compensation § 182 (1958).
'1d. at 613 n. 29, "an injury arising from a strain caused by lifting, pulling, prying
or shoveling . . . constitutes an accidental injury." The requirement that the injury
be accidental has been adopted legislatively or judicially by all but four states
(California, Iowa, Massachusetts and Rhode Island). Thirty-two states use "by acci-
dent". Seven states use the phrase "accidental injury". (Arkansas, Connecticut,
Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, New York and Oklahoma). In four states, the basic
coverage clause contains no such requirement, but reference to the word "accident"
is made elsewhere in the statute. The courts of these states have read "accidental"
into the coverage statute. Ohio has no reference to "accident" anywhere in the
statute but the courts have read the requirement in anyway. Two states, Montana
and Washington, have adopted their own definitions. 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note
2 § 37.10.
n99 C. J. S. Workmen's Compensation § 183 (1958); 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note
2, § 38.30.
"To accomplish this end the economic burden is placed upon industry (and ultimately
the consumers) rather than upon the workers and their dependents who might other-
wise become wards of the state. Horowitz, Current Trends in Basic Principles of
Workmen's Compensation, 12 L. Soc'Y J., 466, 470-71 (1947).
u
1 bid.
"99 C. J. S. Workmen's Compensation § 182 (1958).
1Ibid.
"The "industrial injury" or "accidental injury" concept is used by Montana courts
in discussing ''accident''. ''Industrial accident'' is synonymous with ''injury by
accident" as conceived by other jurisdictions. 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 37.00.
7Laws of Montana 1915, ch. 96, § 6 read: "Injury or injured defined. 'Injury' or
'Injured' refers only to an injury resulting from some fortuitous event, as dis-
tinguished from the contraction of a disease." As amended, Laws of Montana 1961,
ch. 162, § 6, the statute, supra note 1, reads: "' 'Injury' or 'Injured' means a
tangible happening of a traumatic nature from an unexpected cause, resulting in
either external or internal physical harm, and such physical condition as a result
therefrom and excluding disease not traceable to injury."
[Vol. 27,
2
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lowed the majority rule. The earlier decisions demonstrated the court's
willingness to construe the Act liberally in favor of the claimant to ac-
complish its beneficent and remedial purposes.'8 The court has termed
"industrial accidents" such injuries as heart failure,19 heat prostration, 20
neurosis, 21 and back strain.22 All these cases were decided before the 1961
amendment which redefined the term "injury". 23
Under the old act the decisions interpreted "injury resulting from
a fortuitous event" as equivalent to the "injury by accident" language
used by the majority of jurisdictions. 24 Therefore, the decisions incor-
porated the majority rule that there was an injury "by accident" if
either the cause or result was unexpected. The decisions were liberal but
they were within the spirit of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Three significant decisions appear to have precipitated the 1961
amendment to the injury statute. The first decision, Rathbun v. Taber
Tank Lines,25 held that a truck driver who had died of a heart attack while
driving a truck had suffered an "industrial accident". The court rea-
soned that driving long hours without sleep was sufficient undue strain
or exertion to aggravate a pre-existing disease.28 The second decision,
Murphy v. The Anaconda Co.,27 allowed recovery for an employee's heart
attack sustained while pushing a mail cart. The court ruled "that an
unexpected injury received in the ordinary performance of a duty in the
usual manner is an injury by accident. '28 These cases aligned Montana
with the majority of jurisdictions not requiring an ."unusual strain" in
heart attack cases.
Hines v. Industrial Accident Board29 provided the final impetus for
legislative action. The court held that contraction of polio was a com-
pensable injury. Ignoring the provisions of the relatively explicit statute,
the court in Hines appeared to adopt the district court's finding that a
"fortuitous event" is not necessary for a compensable injury.30 In so
finding the district court relied on the Murphy case from which it ex-
tracted an incomplete and misleading statement that "an injury is acci-
dental when either the cause or the result is unexpected." 31 The court
-R.C.M. 1947, § 92-838.
"Rathbun v. Taber Tank Lines, Inc., 129 Mont. 121, 283 P.2d 966 (1955); Murphy
v. Anaconda Co., 133 Mont. 198, 321 P.2d 1094 (1958); Young v. Liberty Nat'l Ins.
Co., 138 Mont. 458, 357 P.2d 886 (1960).
"Ryan v. Industrial Ace. Bd., 100 Mont. 143, 45 P.2d 775 (1935).
nBest v. London Guar. and Ace. Co., 100 Mont. 332, 47 P.2d 157 (1933).
20'Neil v. Industrial Ace. Bd., 107 Mont. 176, 81 P.2d 688 (1938).
"Supra note 17.
t2'athbun v. Taber Tank Lines, supra note 19, at 130-31.
2Ibid.
=Id. at 132.
"Supra note 19.
"Id. at 211, 321 P.2d at 1101.
2138 Mont. 588, 358 P.2d 447 (1960). Mr. Justice Castles dissented in the Hines
case. He correctly pointed out that the old statute specifically excluded "contraction
of disease". The majority of the court did not mention this language.
'Supra note 29, at 591, 358 P.2d at 479.
t Ibid.
1966]
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actually held in Murphy that "an injury is accidental where either the
cause or the result is unexpected or accidental although the work being
done is usual or ordinary as long as the exertion is either the sole or a
contributory cause of the injury. 3 2 (Emphasis added.) In short, Murphy
held that the unexpected cause or result must be traceable to the employ-
ment, whereas liies did not. It is submitted that the legislature enacted
the amendment in direct response to these three decisions.3 3
The new statute requires an "unexpected cause." The Lupien case,
decided after passage of the new statute, held that an employee's death
caused by a heart attack which stemmed from a disease of the arteries
did not meet the "unexpected cause" requirement.a4  The court inter-
preted the statute as requiring an "unusual strain" in heart attack cases.
This interpretation aligns Montana with the minority of jurisdictions2.
The court did recognize that "cardiac cases" might be compensable under
different circumstanees. 36 Mr. Justice Castles concluded that the intent
of the legislature was to read "unexpected 'esult" out of the new act. 37
It is submitted that the legislature's purpose was rather to exclude un-
expected results not directly traceable to job injury. The result excluded
by the statutory definition is the "pure" heart attack which occurs on
the job by happenstance and does not stem from an "unexpected cause"
or an unusual strain or exertion incurred in the course of employment.
The instant decision applies the Lupien interpretation of the amended
injury statute. Justice Castles reasoned that, since both claimants in
Lupien and the instant ease were doing normal work when they sus-
tained their injuries, there was not a sufficient showing of an "unex-
pected cause." 38 This conclusion is unsatisfactory. It is submitted that
the court erred in applying the "unexpected cause" test of a cardiac case
to a back injury case. There seem to be two possible constructions of
"unexpected cause." The narrower construction would apply to heart
attacks. The "unexpected cause" required to find a heart attack com-
pensable demands something outside of the normal employment. For
instance, if a clerk overstrains while lifting a desk, a subsequent heart
attack would probably be compensable.
This restrictive test devised for heart attacks cannot logically be
"Supra note 19, at 211, 321 P.2d at 1101.
n3An interview on March 22, 1966, with a member of the Senate Labor & Commerce
committee which drafted the 1961 amendment, indicated the purpose was to read out
heart attacks and diseases not traceable to injury. The Supreme Court seems to
recognize the legislative intent to exclude disease not traceable to injury. In
LaForest v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 23 St. Rptr. 357, _... P.2d .... (Mont. 1966), a super-
market clerk claimed compensation for an injury to her shoulder caused by lifting
a box of groceries. The court held that the injury was actually caused by a pre-
existing bursitis condition which was not traceable to an on the job injury and thus
not compensable. See also Montana Legislative Sumviary: 1961, 22 MONT. L. REV.
103, 135 (1961); and 22 MONT. L. REV. 195 (1961).
34Lupien v. Montana Record Publishing Co., 143 Mont. 415, 390 P.2d 455 (1964).
Justice Castles wrote the majority opinion.
nSupra note 14.
'1Supra note 34, at 421.
37Ibid.
"Instant case at 283.
[Vol. 27,
4
Montana Law Review, Vol. 27 [1965], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol27/iss2/5
RECENT DECISIONS
applied to injuries to the musculoskeletal system. Merely bending over,
in the ordinary course of employment could constitute the "unexpected
cause" required of an injury to the body structure. Even the minority
rule recognizes that, if an act done in the normal course of employment
is accompanied by a muscular strain or twist, the disabling result may
be compensable because there has been an unusual or excessive exertion.3 9
The "unexpected cause" test of a heart attack when applied to injuries of
the back, goes beyond the intent of the legislature.
An examination of Washington case law illustrates the distinction
between the application of the new statute to heart attacks and to back
injuries. 40 In Windust v. Dept. of Labor & Industries,4 the Washington
Supreme Court overruled prior cases by holding that a workman's fatal
heart attack sustained while performing an ordinary phase of his job
did not fit the statutory definition of injury. Windust laid down the
rule that a heart attack would be a compensable injury only if it resulted
from unusual strain or exertion. In Boeing v. Fine42 the court refused
to apply the "unusual strain" test used in heart attack cases to back
injury litigation.43 The court held that a clerk-typist suffered a com-
pensable back injury when she bent over to answer the telephone. In
Boeing, the court spoke approvingly of the Windust result, pointing out a
heart attack suffered during accustomed exertion is really happenstance
as to time and place. 44 However, it emphasized that there is a valid dis-
tinction between a heart attack and a back injury incurred in the nor-
mal course of employment:
The fundamental differences between heart attacks and back in-juries are such as to render the "unusual exertion" test irrelevant
when transplanted into the area of law dealing with injuries to the
skeletal structure of the body, in particular the back .... It is quite
possible that a slight or usual strain applied at an unusually differ-
ent angle could, through forces of levers, et cetera, overpower and
injure a normal back. Thus, the unusual strain requirement of the
Windust case does not apply to injuries to mechanical structures to
which the angle of application of the force may be vastly more
important than the general level of strain.45
A prima facie showing of unusual or awkward angle in bending
while engaged in regular duties is necessary to entitle a claimant to re-
"Supra note 14.4
°Washington and Montana are the only states with statutes defining an "industrial
injury" or "accidental injury". 'Injury' or 'Injured' means a sudden tangible
happening of a traumatic nature producing an immediate or prompt result occuring
from without and such physical condition as results therefrom. Laws of Washington
1927, ch. 310. § 2, p. 815. This act was later re-enacted into the current statute.
Laws of Washington 1961, ch. 23, § 51.08.100, p. 1299.
152 Wash. 2d 33, 323 P.2d 241 (1958).
4265 Wash. Dec. 2d 149, 396 P.2d 145 (1964).
,Id. at 147. In Boeing the Washington court had to decide whether to extend the
''unusual strain" or "unexpected cause" test imposed by a case in a particular
situation, namely a heart attack. Montana's statute requires an "unexpected cause''
in all cases, but the Washington case gives authority for the conclusion that an
"unexpected cause" in a heart attack case and a back injury case are by no means
the same.
"Ibid.
"Ibid.
1,9661
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cover for a back injury in Washington. To require a showing of an
"unusual strain" as required in heart cases would place an insurmount-
able burden on workmen. 46 It is therefore submitted that the result of
the Boeing case should have been reached in the instant case. The relation-
ship of the Boeing case to the instant case is apparent. There the claimant,
a typist, suffered a back injury while bending and twisting to lift a tele-
phone.47 In the instant case claimant, a lumber stacker, sustained a back
injury while bending and twisting to lift a block of wood.48 The instant
decision, by applying the "unusual strain" test of cardiac cases, failed
to reach a reasonable result. As the Boeing case pointed out: "An un-
thinking or automatic application of the heart rule to the mechanical
structures of the body would be unreasonable, illogical, and unwise. In-
dustry must bear the expense of injuries which are caused by the appli-
cation of force to a mechanical bodily structure. '49
The major purpose of workmen's compensation is to place the bur-
den for work-injuries upon industry, rather than upon the individual
worker, or public or private charity. Such legislation does not have the
same function as commercial life insurance. It provides only that the
worker shall recover for those injuries caused by his employment. This
does not mean that the claimant should be subjected to unwarranted legal
technicalities to prevent recovery for a justified claim. The doctrine set
forth in the Murphy case, requiring liberal construction of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, should be revived.5 0 The intent of the legislature was
to restrict recovery for heart failure and disease not arising out of em-
ployment. The language of the new statute is not so restrictive as to ex-
clude back injuries sustained in the course of employment. Judicial fiat
should not impose narrow limitations upon humanitarian legislation. The
court must act affirmatively to correct this decision. The spirit of work-
men's compensation will be lost if future Montana claimants are bound
by the holding of the instant case.
WILLIAM W. WERTZ.
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT HAS No JURISDICTION OVER A LEASE OF TRIBAL
LAND TO A NoN-INDIAN.-Petitioncrs were Canadian citizens and share-
holders in co-petitioner, the St. Marys Lake Development Corporation.
In 1962, the corporation executed a twenty five year lease' of Blackfeet
tribal land. In 1964, a member of the Blackfeet Tribe filed a complaint
and the defendant Blackfect Tribal Court ordered the petitioners to
"Ibid.
"1Id. at 146.
"Record, James v. V.K.V. Lumber, 401 P.2d 282 (1965), p.3 .
"Boeing v. Fine, supra note 42, at 147.
08Supra note 19, at 1097; R.C.M. 1947, § 92-838.
'The lease was approved by the Secretary of Interior acting through the area director.
[Vol. 27,
6
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